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COMMENT
CLARIFYING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BROTHER-
SISTER CONTROLLED GROUPS OF CORPORATIONS:
UNITED STATES V. VOGEL FERTILIZER CO.
Businessmen long have employed multiple corporations to segregate
one business from another as a planning device for tax and non-tax pur-
poses.1 Consistent with the general notion that a corporation is a
separate entity from its shareholders, each multiple corporation has
been entitled to claim one of each tax benefit granted to any
corporation.2 Therefore, by astute corporate structure planning, corpora-
tions normally referred to as multiple corporations can be entitled to
multiple tax benefits and tax savings not intended for large businesses
To remedy this and other abuses, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act
of 1969.' Portions of the Tax Reform Act expanded the definition of a
brother-sister controlled group5 of corporations and correspondingly
1 See generally Geller, Tax and Non-Tax Motivations for the Creation and Utilization
of Multiple Corporations, 26 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 649 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Geller]; Horwich, A Comparative Study of Consolidated Returns and Other Approaches to
the Multiple Corporation Problem, 20 TAX. L. REV. 529 (1965); Spohr, Multiple Corporations
as a Tax Saving Device: 1913-1969 TRA, 2 TAX ADVISER 91 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Spohr]; Tabolowsky, Advantages in Use of Multiple Corporations in Spite of Reform Ackr
Attendant Hazards, 35 J. TAX 330 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Tobolowsky]; Warhafig, Multi-
ple Corporations: Advantages, Disadvantages and Risks, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 533
(1971). Nontax motivations for creating multiple corporations include the limitation of liabil-
ity, the separation of activities, management and accounting considerations, legal restric-
tions, and creditor preference. Geller, supra, at 661-63.
2 See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 15 (1971 ed.); Geller, supra note 1, passim; White, The Tax
Reform Act of 1969: Demise of Multiple Surtax Exemptions- When Too Much of a Good
Thing Proved Its Undoing, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1353 (1970) [hereinafter cited as White].
See Pearlman, Recasting the Multiple Corporation Group After the Multiple Surtax
Exemption Ends, 41 J. TAX 194, 194-98 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pearlman]; Spohr, supra
note 1, at 93.
' See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 642 (1969) [hereinafter
Zited as Tax Reform Act]. See, e.g., Bonovitz, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Under Sec-
tion 1563: The 80 Percent Ownership Test, 28 TAX LAW. 511, 515-16 (1975) (summary of
legislative history) [hereinafter cited as Bonoyitz]; Thomas, Brother-Sister Multiple Corp-
orations-The Tax Reform Act of 1969 Reformed By Regulation, 28 TAX. L. REV. 65, 70
(1972) (same) [hereinafter cited as Thomas]; White, supra note 2, at 1353-54 (new provisions
limit multiple corporation abuses).
I See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2). A brother-sister controlled group is defined as two or more
interrelated corporations exhibiting the requisite commonality of shareholder financial in-
terest and control. See id.; Libin & Abramowitz, Multiple Corporations: A Surprising Inter-
pretation of Sea 1563(al{2) in Temporary Regulations, 2 TAX ADVISER 326, 326-28 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Libin & Abramowitz]; text accompanying notes 15-17 infra.
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eliminated the availability of certain multiple tax benefits6 to component
members 7 of brother-sister controlled groups of corporations.' In United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,' the United States Supreme Court
clarified the requisite characteristics of a brother-sister controlled group
of corporations by holding the relevant Treasury regulation invalid."0
The provisions of section 1561(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
limit component members of a controlled group of corporations in the ag-
gregate to the same maximum benefits available to a corporation not a
' See Tax Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 401(a)(1) enacting I.R.C. § 1561(a). Section
1561(a)(1) prevents component members, see note 7 infra, of a controlled group of corpora-
tions from lowering their total tax liability through the spreading of income. Id. Section
1561(a)(1) treats the aggregate taxable income of a controlled group of corporations the
same as the taxable income of a single corporate entity. Id. § 1561(a)(1); see id. § 11(b). If §
1561(a)(1) did not foreclose the tax benefit, multiple corporations with the same aggregate
income as a single corporation would incur less tax liability due to the graduated corporate
tax rates. See I.R.C. § 11(b). In 1981, for example, $200,000 of taxable income attributable to
a single corporation would result in tax liability of $72,750. Id. On the other hand, two
separate corporations, each with $100,000 of taxable income, would incur $53,500 tax liabili-
ty in the aggregate, $26,750 for each corporation. Id. Section 1561(a)(2) limits the component
members of a controlled group of corporations to only one $150,000 accumulated earnings
credit. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(2); see id. §§ 533(c)(2)-(c)(3). Section 1561(a)(3) limits the component
members of a controlled group of corporations to only one $25,000 small business deduction
for life insurance companies defined under §§ 804(a)(3) and 809(d)(10). I.R.C. § 1561(at{3); see
id. §§ 804(a)(3), 809(d)(10).
Classification as a controlled group of corporations also limits the availability of certain
other tax benefits. See Weisman, Brother-Sister Controlled Corporations: On and Off the
Road to the Supreme Court with an Edsel, 56 TAXES 475, 476-77 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Weisman]. Classification as a controlled group affects investment tax credit, first year
bonus depreciation, minimum tax, and accounting elections. I.R.C. §§ 45(a)(5) (investment
tax credit), 179(d)(6)-(7) (bonus depreciation), 58(b) (minimum tax); see Weisman, supra, at
477. In addition, controlled group status has significance other than the denial of certain tax
benefits. Bonovitz, supra note 4, at 512-13; Weisman, supra, at 477. Classification as a con-
trolled group of corporations affects treatment under The Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA), The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), The Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and income tax withholding. Bonovitz, supra note 4, at
512-13; Weisman, supra, at 477; see Rev. Rul. 73-162, 1973-1 C.B. 417, amplified by Rev. Rul.
74-390, 1974-2 C.B. 331, amplifying Rev. Rul. 69-316, 1969-1 C.B. 263 (rulings governing
FUTA, FICA and income tax withholding); The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
' See I.R.C. § 1563. A corporation is a component member of a controlled group of
corporations if on December 31st of the tax year the corporation fulfills the ownership re-
quirements for any class of controlled group. Id.; see id §§ 1563(b)(2)-(3) (special rules for "ex-
cluded" corporations and "additional members"); note 13 infra.
8 Tax Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 401 amending I.R.C. §§ 1561-1563. Prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, a brother-sister controlled group of corporations existed if one per-
son owned 80% or more of the stock of two or more corporations. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Revenue Act]. See, e.g., Spohr, supra
note 1, at 93; Thomas, supra note 4, at 66-70. For the expanded definition of a brother-sister
corporation, see text accompanying notes 15-17 infra.
102 S. Ct. 821 (1982).
, Id.; see text accompanying note 77 infra; note 126 infra.
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component member of a controlled group." Therefore, the provisions
eliminate many possible additional benefits or lower tax rates which
would result from employing multiple corporations. 2 A group of corpora-
tions, however, must qualify as a controlled group under section 156313 of
the IRC before the limitations of section 1561(a) apply.' Section 1563(a)(2)
outlines a two-prong test for the determination of a brother-sister con-
trolled group. 5 To satisfy the first prong of the test, five or fewer per-
sons must own stock comprising at least eighty percent of the voting
power or total value of each of two or more corporations." Additionally,
the same individuals' identical ownership of stock in each corporation
must total more than fifty percent of the voting power or total value of
each corporation." If a group of corporations meets these criteria, each
' I.R.C. § 1561(a); see note 6 supra.
1 See I.R.C. § 1561(a); note 6 supra. Multiple corporations still can employ strategies
enabling the component members to enjoy certain tax benefits despite the impact of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969. See generally Pearlman, supra note 3, passim; Tobolowsky, supra
note 1, passim.
" I.R.C. § 1563. Section 1563 defines a controlled group of corporations as a "parent-
subsidiary controlled group," a "brother-sister controlled group," a "combined group" and
"certain insurance companies" that qualify as one of the three prior groups. I.R.C. §§
1563(a)(1) (parent-subsidiary), 1563(a)(2) (brother-sister), 1563(a)(3) (combined group),
1563(a)(4) (certain insurance companies). The controlled group tests primarily measure the
degree of shareholder interrelationship exhibited by common control and close financial
holdings. See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1)-(a)(4); Pearlman, supra note 3, at 198-99.
" See note 6 supra.
,' I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) provides:
Brother-sister controlled group.-Two or more corporations if 5 or fewer persons
who are individuals, estates, or trusts own ... stock possessing-(A) at least 80
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of the stock of each
corporation, and (B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking into account the stock
ownership of each such person only to the extent such stock ownership is identical
with respect to each such corporation.
Id.
See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(A) (commonly referred to as the "80% test"); note 15 supra.
1 See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(B) (commonly referred to as the "50% test"); note 15 supra.
Taxpayers have not challenged the meaning of the 50% test despite the seemingly confus-
ing statutory language. Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 5, at 327. But see Yaffe Iron &
Metal Corp. v. United States, 593 F.2d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1979) (unsuccessful taxpayer argu-
ment that 500/0 control test only measures voting control rather than alternatively value or
voting control), cert denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979). The 50% test draws from the same group
of individuals fulfilling the 80% test. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(B). The 50% test, however, measures
each individual shareholder's lowest common interest in each corporation. Id.; see Libin &
Abramowitz, supra note 5, at 327. The aggregate of the common interests must exceed 50%
to satisfy the 50% test. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(B). For example, A owns 300/0 of Corporation X
and 70% of Corporation Y. B owns 70% of Corporation X and 30% of Corporation Y. A's
common interest in the pair of corporations is 30%, the lowest interest in either corpora-
tion. B's common interest in the pair of corporations is also 30%, B's lowest interest in
either corporation. The aggregate of A and B's common interests totals 60%, thus satisfy-
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component corporation is allocated only its proportionate share of each
tax benefit as specified under section 1561(a), rather than a full tax
benefit for each separate corporate entity.1 8
After enactment of section 1563(a)(2), the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3)19 interpreting
ing the 50% test. See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(B); Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 5, at 327. See,
e.g., Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1980) (stipulated
satisfaction of 50% test because meaning undisputed), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1250 (1982); T.
L. Hunt, Inc. of Tex. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532, 533-35 (8th Cir. 1977) (same).
18 I.R.C. § 1561(a). Section 1561(a) allocates each component member of a controlled
group of corporations an equal share of the tax benefits as limited by §§ 1561(a)(1)-(a)(3). Id.
§§ 1561(a)(1}-(a)(3). Section 1561(a), however, permits unequal apportionment of taxable in-
come among the component members of a controlled group upon unanimous consent by all
members. Id. § 1561(a).
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) T.D. 6845, 1965-2 C.B. 325, amended by T.D. 6960, 1968-2
C.B. 342, amended by T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 291, amended by T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 228 pro-
vides:
Brother-sister controlled group-(i) The term 'brother-sister controlled group'
means two or more corporations if the same five or fewer persons who are in-
dividuals, estates, or trusts own (directly and with tuhe application of the rules con-
tained in paragraph (b) of § 1.1563-3), singly or in combination, stock
possessing- (a) At least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares
of all classes of the stock in each corporation, and (b) More than 50 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50
percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of each corporation, tak-
ing into account the stock ownership of each such person only to the extent such
stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corporation.
(ii) The principles of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following ex-
amples:
Example (1). The outstanding stock of corporations P, Q, R, S, and T, which have





P Q R S T
A ...... 60/ 60/o 60% 60%/ 100/0 60/o
B ...... 40% - - - -
C . . . . . . - 40% - ...
D ...... - - 40% - -
E ...... - - - 40% -
Total 100/0 100%/ 100 0 100/ 100/ 60%
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the statute." The preamble to the two-prong test under the regulation
provides that a brother-sister controlled group of corporations is defined
as "[t]wo or more corporations if the same five or fewer persons own ...
singly or in combination ..... the requisite stock percentages." Since the
regulation's inception, the phrase "singly or in combination" has been a
constant source of conflict between the Commissioner and the Tax
Court, the Court of Claims, and various United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals.' The controversy has revolved around the first prong of the
brother-sister controlled group test outlined in section 1563(a)(2), the
eighty-percent ownership requirementS The Commissioner relied on
Corporations P, Q, R, S, and T are members of a brother-sister controlled group.
Example (2). The outstanding stock of coporations U and V, which have only one








I ....... 20% - -
J ....... 55% 55% 55/o
K ....... - 10% -
L ....... - 10% -
M ....... - 10% -
N ....... - 10% -
0 ....... 5%
Total 100% 100% 55%
Corporations U and V are not members of a brother-sister controlled group
because at least 80 percent of the stock of each corporation is not owned by the
same 5 or fewer persons.
Id.
" See I.R.C. § 7805(a). Section 7805(a) gives the Secretary or his delegate the authority
to issue "all needful rules and regulations." Id. Regulations issued pursuant to § 7805(a) are
classified as interpretative regulations. See id.; Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rul-
ings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 758-59, 758 n.3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Rogovin]. Interpretative regulations are distinguished from legislative regulations. Id. at
758-59, 758 n.3. The Commissioner issues legislative regulations where Congress has
granted specific authority within the particular Code section for the Commissioner to for-
mulate detailed rules. Id.; see I.R.C. § 1502 (example of legislative regulation authority). The
courts accord more deference to legislative regulations than interpretative regulations.
Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); text accompanying notes 84-93 infra.
Courts generally defer to the agency construction if the regulation reasonably implements
the congressional intent. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967); text accompany-
ing notes 84-93 infra. See generally Brown, Regulations, Reenactment and the Revenue
Acts, 54 HARv. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1941) (deference owed regulations); Rogovin, supra
(same).
21 See note 19 supra.
" See note 25 infra.
I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(A) (reproduced at note 15 supra).
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the phrase "singly or in combination" contained in the regulation24 to
maintain that various subgroups of five or fewer persons owning the requi-
site eighty-percent of the different corporations satisfy the first-prong of
the brother-sister controlled group test.25 Conversely, the Tax Court in-
terpreted section 1563(a)(2) as requiring the same five or fewer
shareholders to satisfy the eighty-percent test for each corporation in
the controlled group." The Tax Court's interpretation, unlike the Com-
missioner's, prevents the inclusion of a shareholder's stock ownership in
the eighty-percent test if that shareholder does not own stock in every
corporation in the controlled groupY The Tax Court consistently has
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 248; note 19 supra. E.g., Delta
Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1980); Allen Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 614 F.2d 336, 338 (2d Cir. 1980). Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293,
1973-2 C.B. 248 ("singly or in combination" language) with I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (absence of
"singly or in combination" language).
I Since the regulation's promulgation, taxpayers and the Commissioner have litigated
the validity of Treasury Regulation § 1.1563-1(a)(3). The courts have focused on the "singly
or in combination" language of the regulation. E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
102 S. Ct. 821, 832 (1982) (resolving issue by invalidating regulation), affg, 634 F.2d 497, 501
(Ct. Cl. 1980); Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 449 (5th Cir. 1980) (in-
validating regulation), aff'g, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485, 1486-87 (1978); Allen Oil Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 614 F.2d 336, 341 (2nd Cir. 1980) (sustaining regulation), rev'g, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 355,
357 (1979); T. L. Hunt, Inc. of Tex. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532, 534-35 (8th Cir. 1977) (sus-
taining regulation), rev'g, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966, 971-72 (1976); Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501, 502 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (sustaining regulation), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977), rev'g, 65 T.C. 798, 801-02 (1976); Charles Baloian Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 68 T.C. 620, 631 (1977) (court reviewed decision invalidating regulation); Davidson
Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 299, 301 (1979) (invalidating regulation).
,S See note 25 supra
' The Tax Court first invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) in Fairfax Auto Parts of
Northern Virginia, Inc. v. Commissioner. 65 T.C. 798 (1976). The Tax Court adheres to its
rationale and has based subsequent decisions on Fairfax despite the Fourth Circuit's reversal
of Fairfax and similar reversals by other circuits. See Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 38
T.C.M. (CCH) 355 (1979) (invalidating regulation), rev'd, 614 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1980); T. L.
Hunt, Inc. of Tex. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966 (1976) (same), rev'd, 562 F.2d 532
(8th Cir. 1977). In Fairfax, one shareholder owned 55% of NOVA corporation and 100% of
FAP corporation. 65 T.C. at 801. The other shareholder owned the remaining 45% of NOVA
corporation and 0/ of FAP. Id. at 800. The Commissioner determined the taxpayers compon-
ent members of a brother-sister controlled group under § 1563(a)(2) and allocated FAP and
NOVA each one-half the surtax exemption. Id. at 800-01. See note 36 infra (explanation of
surtax exemption concept that preceded current graduated tax rate schedule). The parties
stipulated the 50% test was satisfied. 65 T.C. at 802. See note 17 supra. The Tax Court in
Fairfax recognized that the taxpayers satisfied the 80% test according to Treas. Reg. §
1.1563-1(a)(3). 65 T.C. at 802. The Fairfax court, however, held the Treasury regulation in-
valid as an unwarranted extension of the statutory language of § 1563(a)(2) and congres-
sional intent. Id. The Tax Court interpreted the 80%/ test as requiring each person counted
for purposes of the 800/0 test to own stock in every component member of a brother-sister
controlled group. Id. at 803. The Tax Court in Fairfax, therefore, held that the taxpayers
did not satisfy the 80% requirement under § 1563(a)(2)(A). Id. Accordingly, under the Tax
Court's analysis, example 1 in Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) does not qualify as a brother-sister
controlled group. See id.; note 19 supra.
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held the Treasury Regulation invalid as an unreasonable interpretation
of section 1563(a)(2) and contrary to congressional intent.28 The Commis-
sioner, however, refused to acquiesce" and appealed the numerous Tax
Court decisions invalidating Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) to
the various United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. 0 The circuit courts
had been divided on the issue3 Noting the numerous inconsistent court
decisions in the relatively short period of time following the enactment
of section 1563(a)(2), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co. to resolve the conflict among the
lower courts.2
In Vogel, Arthur Vogel (Vogel) and Richard Crain (Crain) owned
77.49 and 22.51 percent, respectively, of the issued and outstanding
stock of Vogel Fertilizer Company (Vogel Fertilizer) during the tax years
1973, 1974, and 1975.11 For the same tax years, Vogel owned 87.5 percent
of the voting power and between 90.66 and 93.42 percent of the value of
the common stock of Vogel Popcorn Company (Vogel Popcorn). 4 Crain,
however, owned no stock in Vogel Popcorn. 5
Vogel Fertilizer did not claim a full surtax exemption" on its tax
" See note 25 supra.
An acquiescence by the Commissioner means the Commissioner will abide by the
court's decision in subsequent situations involving similar facts. See Rogovin, supra note 20,
at 771-73. The acquiescence program largely grew up by accident. Id. at 771. Originally, the
Commissioner issued acquiescences and nonacquiescences to notify the taxpayer receiving a
favorable opinion from the Board of Tax Appeals whether the Commissioner intended to ap-
peal the decision. Id. Through the years, the acquiescence program evolved to mean that
the Commissioner, upon acquiescence, did not intend to litigate the same issue again. Id. at
772. See generally id. at 771-73 (history and analysis of acquiescence program).
, See note 25 supra
s, The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits reversed the Tax Court's decisions that
held Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) invalid. See Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 341
(2d Cir. 1980); T. L. Hunt, Inc. of Tex. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532, 537 (8th Cir. 1977);
Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam). The Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the Tax Court's decision invalidating the
regulation. Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 451 (5th Cir. 1980).
450 U.S. 994 (1981).
Id. at 825.
Id. Vogel as trustee of the Alex Vogel Family Trust owned the remainder of the
Vogel Popcorn stock (voting preferred stock). Id. at 825 n.4. Vogel is not deemed to own this
stock for tax purposes. Id.; I.R.C. § 1563(d)(2), (e) (attribution rules).
102 S. Ct. at 825.
Graduated rates superseded the "normal" and "surtax" corporate tax structure for
tax years after 1978. I.R.C. § 11(b) (as amended Act. of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92
Stat. 2820, § 301 (1978)). Prior to 1979, corporate tax consisted of a normal tax that applied
to all taxable income and a surtax that applied to income in excess of a stated amount. 26
U.S.C. § 11(b) (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 11(b)). The surtax generally applied to tax-
able income in excess of the "surtax exemption." Id. The surtax exemption was the amount
excluded from the additional tax. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
[1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2165 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The
surtax exemption thus lowered the effective tax rate on the first exempted amount of tax-
able income. Id. Congress enacted the surtax exemption to benefit small corporations. Id.
1982] 1553
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returns during the years 1973, 1974 and 1975, relying on Treasury
Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) as foreclosing a full surtax exemption."
Subsequently, the Tax Court in Fairfax Auto Parts of Northern Virginia
v. Commissioner3 8 held the regulation invalid because the regulation per-
mitted the Commissioner to include a shareholder's stock ownership for
purposes of the eighty-percent test even though the shareholder did not
own stock in every corporation in the brother-sister controlled group of
corporations. Vogel Fertilizer filed timely claims for refunds relying on
the Tax Court decision in Fairfax Auto." Vogel Fertilizer asserted that
Vogel Popcorn and Vogel Fertilizer were not members of a controlled
group, therefore, entitling Vogel Fertilizer to a full surtax exemption for
the years in question."
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the refund claims.42 Vogel
Fertilizer then brought suit for a refund in the United States Court of
Claims." The Court of Claims held that Vogel Popcorn and Vogel Fer-
tilizer did not constitute a brother-sister controlled group within the
meaning of section 1563(a)(2)(A) and granted Vogel Fertilizer summary
judgment." Furthermore, the Court of Claims held Treasury Regulation
section 1.1563-1(a)(3) invalid to the extent the regulation takes into ac-
count stock held by a shareholder who does not own stock in each cor-
poration in the controlled group."
The new graduated rates accomplish the same congressional purpose. See I.R.C. § 11(b). Ad-
ditionally, the new graduated rates offer more tax savings to small corporations by
substituting a five-step rate structure in place of the original surtax exemption. I.R.C. §
11(b).
, 102 S. Ct. at 825.
65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'd, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
904 (1977).
65 T.C. at 801-02; see note 27 supra.
40 102 S. Ct. at 825. The taxpayer must file a claim for refund or credit within three
years from the time of filing or within two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever
expired later. I.R.C. § 6511. See generally B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 113.1-.9 (1981; TAX MNGM'T (BNA) 28-3rd (1978).
" 102 S. Ct. at 825. As originally enacted, the provisions of §§ 1561-1563 granted con-
trolled groups the option of taking multiple surtax exemptions and paying a penalty. Id. at
825 n.5; 26 U.S.C. § 1562 (1964). Section 1564 provided for a gradual phase out of the exemp-
tion option. I.R.C. § 1564; 102 S. Ct. at 825 n.5. Vogel Fertilizer used the multiple surtax ex-
emption in 1973 and 1975. 102 S. Ct. at 825 n.5; see I.R.C. § 1564(a). Vogel Fertilizer then
paid the penalty. 102 S. Ct. at 825 n.5; see 26 U.S.C. § 1562(b) (1970). Vogel Fertilizer
allocated to Vogel Popcorn the single surtax exemption allowed for the tax year ending
November 30, 1975. 102 S. Ct. at 825-26 n.5; see 26 U.S.C. § 1561(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
" 102 S. Ct. at 825.
Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl. 1980), affd, 102 S. Ct. 821
(1982).
Id. at 498-512.
Id. The Court of Claims in Vogel used the same basic analysis as the affirming
Supreme Court opinion. See id. at 499-513; Vogel, 102 S. Ct. at 827-32; text accompanying
notes 46-77 infra. Through a somewhat circular analysis the Court of Claims stated the ra-
tionale for according little if any significance to the regulation. See Vogel Fertilizer, 634
1554 [Vol. 39:1547
VOGEL FERTILIZER CO.
The Supreme Court in Vogel affirmed the Court of Claims."6 The
Court noted that Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel Popcorn satisfied the fifty-
percent common ownership requirement under the brother-sister con-
trolled group test.' Accordingly, the Court in Vogel focused on the
disputed meaning of the eighty-percent requirement. 8 The Court re-
jected the "singly or in combination" language of the Treasury Regula-
tion as incompatible with the legislative history and an unreasonable in-
terpretation of section 1563(a)(2). 9
The Vogel Court first analyzed the statutory language and the inter-
preting regulation." The Court noted that while the language of the
statute is not completely unambiguous, the taxpayer's interpretation is
in closer harmony with the statute than the Commissioner's regulation.1
The Court maintained that the statutory term "brother-sister controlled
group" connotes a close horizontal relation between two or more corp-
orations which suggests that the same persons must comprise the
eighty-percent ownership requirement of each corporation.2 Additionally,
the Vogel Court noted that the original brother-sister control group
statute enacted by the Revenue Act of 1964 required common owner-
ship.'
The Court next focused on the structure of the statute. The Court in
Vogel stated that precisely the same shareholders must satisfy both
prongs of the test because, as the Tax Court stated, "five or fewer per-
sons" is the conjunctive subject of both prongs of the brother-sister con-
trolled group test.? Accordingly, the Vogel Court deduced that if the
same shareholders whose holdings are considered for purposes of the
eighty-percent test must be considered for the purposes of the fifty-
F.2d at 512. First, the Vogel Fertilizer court stated that if § 1563(a)(2)(B) applies only when
each stockholder owns stock in each corporation, the regulation is invalid as an impermissi-
ble alteration of the statute. Id. Second, if the 80% test considers shareholders that do not
hold stock in every corporation in the controlled group, the conclusion flows from the
statute itself without necessary reference to the interpreting regulation. Id. Thus, the
Vogel Fertilizer court stated that the regulation is either inconsistent with the statute or
adds nothing to the statute. Id. Through this convoluted reasoning the Court of Claims con-
cluded that in either case the regulation is not entitled to the significance normally owed a
Treasury regulation. See id. Accordingly, the Court of Claims held Treas. Reg. §
1.1563-1(a)(3) invalid to the extent that the regulation considers for purposes of the 80% re-
quirement stock ownership of a shareholder who does not own stock in every corporation in
the controlled group. Id.
102 S. Ct. at 832.
' Id. at 826; see notes 15 & 17 supra.





Id. at 828-29; see Revenue Act, supra note 8; text accompanying notes 103-106 infra.
102 S. Ct. at 827; see Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798,
803 (1976).
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percent test, the eighty-percent test also must require common owner-
ship.5
In further support of the invalidation of the regulation, the Court ex-
amined the legislative history of section 1563(a)(2)5 6 The Court noted
that Congress intended to curb the abuse of multiple incorporation
through the use of the controlled group test. The Vogel Court observed
that the intended targets of section 1563(a)(2) were groups of inter-
related corporations characterized by common control and ownership.-
While noting that the fifty-percent test measures the overlap between
two corporations, the Court stated that the history of the enactment of
section 1563(a)(2) evidences that Congress intended the eighty-percent
requirement to be the primary test for defining corporation interrela-
tionship. 9 In examining the legislative history of section 1563(a)(2), the
Vogel Court focused on the Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969
(Hearings)." The Court stated that in representations before Congress
the Treasury Department explicitly included common ownership in the
eighty-percent requirement." According to the Vogel Court, the "singly
1 102 S. Ct. at 827. The Vogel Court only cited Fairfax Auto Parts in support of the
reasoning that the 80/o test required common ownership. Id.; see 65 T.C. 798, 803 (1976).
The Court stated that the phrase "each such person" in 1563(a)(2)(B), the 50% test,
strengthens the argument the same shareholders whose holdings are considered for pur-
poses of the 80% test also must be considered for the purposes of the 50% test. Id. at 827-28
n.8; see Fairfax Auto Parts, 65 T.C. 798, 803 (1976), rev'd, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
102 S. Ct. at 828-31.
5, Id. at 828; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2165-67. The Court quoted from a
section of the House Ways and Means Report. 102 S. Ct. at 828. The House Committee
stated that large corporations employing multiple corporate structure should not be allowed
to take advantage of tax benefits intended for small corporations. H. R. REP. No. 91-413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1746-47.
102 S. Ct. at 828.
59 Id. The Vogel Court relied on the Treasury Department's "General Explanation" as
clarifying that Congress intended the 80% requirement to be the primary basis for deter-
mining whether two or more corporations represented the same financial interests. Id.; see
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Subject of Tax Reform,
91st Congress, 1st Sess., pt. 14, 5385-400 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (general ex-
planation). The explanation outlined the respective roles of the 80% and 50% requirements
as follows:
This provision expands present law by considering the combined stock ownership
of five individuals, rather than one individual, in applying the 80-percent test....
However, in order to insure that this expanded definition of brother-sister con-
trolled group applies only to those cases where the five or fewer individuals hold
their 80 percent in a way which allows them to operate the corporations as one
economic entity, the proposal would add an additional rule that the ownership of
the five or fewer individuals must constitute more than 50 percent of the stock of
each corporation considering, in this test of ownership, stock of a particular person
only to the extent that it is owned identically with respect to each corporation.
Hearings, supra, at 5394 (also reprinted in Vogel, 102 S. Ct. at 829).
, See note 59 supra; text accompanying notes 107-118 infra.
e, 102 S. Ct. at 829-30; see Hearings supra note 59, at 5168; text accompanying notes
107-118 infra (language quoted in text).
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or in combination" language of the challenged regulation clearly is in-
compatible with the Treasury's representations in the proposals of the
amendment to Congress.2 The Court maintained that under the
challenged regulation, the eighty-percent test measures only whether
the brother-sister corporations are closely held. 3 The Court further
recognized that the fact that a corporation is closely held, absent com-
mon ownership, is irrelevant to the congressional purpose of identifying
interrelationship." The Supreme Court accorded great weight to the
Treasury Department's representations in the proposal of the amend-
ment in light of the subsequent legislative history confirming that Con-
gress adopted not only the proposal but also the Department's explana-
tion and interpretation."
Thus, through analysis. of the statutory language and the relevant
legislative hidtory, the Supreme Court found that the taxpayer's inter-
pretation of the statute was more reasonable than the Commissioner's
regulation. Before invalidating the regulation, however, the Court
briefly determined the extent of deference owed to a Treasury regula-
tion promulgated under the general rule-making authority granted by
Congress in section 7805(a)." Although noting that deference in no way
displaces the framework for judicial analysis, 6 the Vogel Court stated
that deference ordinarily is due the agency construction if the regulation
reasonably implements congressional intent. The Court observed that a
regulation issued under the general grant of authority is owed less
deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to
define a statutory term or prescribe a method of implementing a
statutory provision.10 Furthermore, the Court maintained that because
Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) purports only to clarify what
Congress already defined with considerable specificity, the Commis-
sioner's authority in the promulgation of the regulation is more cir-
cumscribed than if Congress had been more general in its explanation.7
"2 102 S. Ct. at 830; see note 59 supra.
' 102 S. Ct. at 830. The Court in Vogel relied on Judge Webster's statements in his
dissenting opinion in T. L. Hunt Inc. of Tex. v. Commissioner: "It is not the smallness of
the number of persons in each company that triggers § 1563; it is the sameness of that small
number" (emphasis in original). Id.; see 562 F.2d 532, 537 (8th Cir. 1977).
" 102 S. Ct. at 830; see note 63 supra.
102 S. Ct. at 831. The Vogel Court relied on Zuber v. Allen as supporting the pro-
position that although Congress' understanding of the legislation controls, agency represen-
tations are entitled to "great weight." Id. at 830-31. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192
(1969).
102 S. Ct. at 828-32. See text accompanying notes 56-65 supra.
, 102 S. Ct. at 827-28. Section 7805(a) grants the Secretary or his 4elegate the authority
to issue needful rules and regulations. I.R.C. § 7805(a); see note 20 supra.
" 102 S. Ct. at 828; see United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973).
6' 102 S. Ct. at 828; see United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
70 102 S. Ct. at 827; see Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
"' 102 S. Ct. at 827; see National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
476-77 (1979); Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939) (statute so
general in terms as to render interpretative regulation appropriate).
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The Court observed that although no words in section 1563(a)(2)(A) ex-
plicitly required common ownership, a court should not sustain the
Treasury regulation merely because the regulation technically is not in-
consistent with the the statutory language.7 2 The fact that the regulation
is inconsistent with the congressional intent is sufficient to overturn the
regulation. '3 Conversely, a Treasury regulation is not invalid merely
because the statutory language will support a contrary interpretation.
7 '
The Court concluded that the challenged regulation is not a reasonable
statutory interpretation unless the regulation corresponds with the
statute's origin and purpose.7 5 The Supreme Court in Vogel held that the
legislative history and the statutory language required the invalidation
of Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3), interpreting section
1563(a)(2) of the IRC.7' Accordingly, the Vogel Court held that a
shareholder cannot be considered for purposes of the eighty-percent test
unless the shareholder owns stock in each corporation."
Dissenting Justices Blackmun and White criticized the Vogel major-
r 102 S. Ct. at 828. See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(A); note 15 supra.
102 S. Ct. at 828. See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 547 (1973).
7' 102 S. Ct. at 828.
Id. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
102 S. Ct. at 832. Before invalidating the regulation, the Vogel Court rejected the
Commissioner's argument that Congress impliedly approved the Commissioner's interpreta-
tion of § 1511(b)(2) in § 1563(a)(2). Id. See House Report, supra note 57, at 1956. The Vogel
Court noted that even assuming the Commissioner's argument on implied approval, no
language in the regulations suggests that the Treasury Department interpreted § 1551(b)(2)
as not having a common ownership requirement. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(e), T.D. 7376,
1975-2 C.B. 237. The Commissioner relied on example 4 under Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(g)(4),
T.D. 7376, 1975-2 C.B. 237. 102 S. Ct. at 831 n.13. These examples apply to transferor-
transferee corporations and properly cannot be compared with § 1563(a)(2). Id. See I.R.C. §
1563(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(e), T.D. 7376, 1975-2 C.B. 237. See also Fairfax Auto Parts
of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 798, 806-07 (1976) (noting that analogy to § 1563(a)(2)
difficult since no way to determine which company is transferor and which transferee). In a
similar vein, the Vogel Court dismissed the Commissioner's assertion that Congress im-
pliedly approved all the regulations promulgated under § 1563(a)(2) by referring to §
1563(a)(2) in § 1015 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 102 S. Ct. at
831. According to the Vogel Court, the intent of the Congress which amended § 1563, not
that of the Congress which enacted § 1015, is controlling. 102 S. Ct. at 832. See Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977). Finally, the Court rejected the Commissioner's
argument that an application of the taxpayer's interpretation would result in nonsensical
results. 102 S. Ct. at 832. The Commissioner noted that under the taxpayer's interpretation,
if Crain owned but one share of Vogel Popcorn, the 80-percent requirement would be
satisfied. Id. The Vogel Court stated that Congress deliberately substituted a mechanical
test to replace the subjective case-by-case analysis. Id. See H. R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., 116-223, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1313, 1425-32; Weisman,
supra note 6, at 484. The Court further stated that sharp dividing lines that are crossed by
incremental changes are inherent in any objective test. 102 S. Ct. at 832. The Court added
that ownership of even only one share of stock plays an important role in the function of the
test because ownership ensures that each of the shareholders knows of the other corpora-
tions within the controlled group. Id. See note 126 infra.
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ity's decision invalidating the regulation." The dissent did not contend
that the majority's legislative interpretation of the statute was
unreasonable. 9 Rather, the dissent attacked the majority's decision
because the Court did not establish that the Commissioner's interpreta-
tion w~s incorrect." Pointing to the ambiguous nature of both the
legislative materials and the statutory language, the dissent would have
deferred to the Commissioner's interpretation. The dissent noted that
the regulation is not unreasonable because the regulation ensures that
the stock is closely held 2 The dissent, therefore, concluded that the
Supreme Court should have sustained the regulation. 3
Courts generally defer to the Treasury's administrative actions. 4 On
numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has stated that contemp-
oraneous construction of a statute by those charged with the administra-
tion of the revenue laws is accorded great weight and a court should in-
validate the regulation only if the regulation is unreasonable and clearly
inconsistent with the statute. 5 In construing the reasonableness of ad-
ministrative regulations, courts first examine the statutory language.8
If the statute is unambiguous and the regulation is inconsistent with the
statute, courts abide by the statute. 7 If the statute is ambiguous,
77 102 S. Ct. at 832.
11 Id. at 832-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 832.
" Id. The dissent did not maintain that the Commissioner's interpretation of the
statute was compelled by the legislative history. Id. at 834. The dissent stated that the ma-
jority failed to realize that certain statutory ambiguities are incapable of definitive resolu-
tion. Id. Accordingly, the dissent in Vogel asserted that the majority did not, by virtue of
the remaining ambiguity, prove the Commissioner's interpretation incorrect. Id.
81 102 S. Ct. at 834. The Vogel dissent cited National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United
States in support of the proposition that the Commissioner, not the courts, has the choice
among reasonable interpretations. Id. See 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1972); United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
102 S. Ct. at 834. See Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 1980).
102 S. Ct. at 834. See note 81 supra.
u See note 85 infra.
E.g., National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1979)
(choice among reasonable interpretations for Commissioner not courts); Bingler v. Johnson,
394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969) (contemporaneous construction of statute must be sustained
unless unreasonable and inconsistent with statute); Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber
Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948) (same); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378
(1931) (regulation valid unless unreasonable or inconsistent with statute).
" See, eg., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979)
(language of statute starting point in statutory construction); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (same); Delta Metalforming Co.
v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
E.g., Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936) (no power to amend unam-
biguous statute by regulation); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S.
269, 273 (1933) (same); Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740, 757-59 (1931) (ad-
ministrative authorities cannot alter explicit statutory provisions); Iselin v. United States,
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however, courts usually defer to the regulation's interpretation of the
statute.88 Furthermore, courts examine the statute's legislative history
to resolve whether the questioned regulation is a reasonable implemen-
tation of the congressional mandate. 9 The Supreme Court in Vogel
acknowledged that the statute is unclear. 9 Commentators have viewed
the statute as open to as many as four different interpretations."
Because of the ambiguity of the statute and the highly criticized
Treasury regulation interpreting the statute,9 2 the Court first construed
the statute and then resorted to an in-depth analysis of the legislative
history.93
The Vogel Court's statutory analysis, however, resolved little of the
statute's ambiguity.94 The majority's assertion that the phrase "brother-
270 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926) (departmental construction cannot enlarge coverage of unam-
biguous statute). See generally Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 252, 261-62 (1940) (deference owed treasury regulations) [hereinafter cited as
Alvord].
" E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 393, 399-401 (1939) (long continued
administrative interpretation has weight in resolving statutory ambiguity); Armstrong
Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 330-33 (1938) (contemporary ad-
ministrative interpretation given weight); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375,
378 (1931) (contemporaneous construction entitled to great weight in resolving statutory
ambiguity); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145 (1920) (same). See generally
Alvord, supra note 87, at 262.
E.g., Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 675-77 (1933); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers,
283 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1931). See generally Alvord, supra note 87, at 262. See also de
Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 530-36
(1940) (theories on statutory interpretation).
'o 102 S. Ct. at 827. The Vogel Court stated that the statute was "not completely
unambiguous." Id.
"' Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 5, passim. The authors viewed § 1563(a)(2)(A) open
to four possible interpretations. Id. at 327. Under the "literal" interpretation, the statute re-
quires only that each corporation be at least 80% owned by any five or fewer individuals.
Id. The "sweeping" interpretation requires the same five or fewer persons to satisfy the
80/n ownership requirement. Id. The "intermediate" interpretation requires that no person
in the 80/o ownership group of each corporation have a "conflicting counterpart in the other
ownership group(s)." Id. The "narrow" interpretation requires that the same five or fewer
persons must satisfy the 800/o test in each corporation. Id. The authors stated the Treasury
regulations adopted the sweeping view. Id. at 328. The Vogel Court construed the proper in-
terpretation as what the authors termed the "narrow" interpretation. 102 S. Ct. at 832; see
Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 5, at 327.
1 Commentators highly criticized the regulations interpreting § 1563(a)(2)(A). E.g.,
Bonovitz, supra note 4, at 513-31; Kringel, Multiple Corporation Proposed Regulations
Raise More Questions Than They Answer, 36 J. TAX 194, passim (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Kringel]; Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 5, passim; Pearlman, supra note 3, passim. In
1974 the Tax Section of the American Bar Association proposed recommended amendments
to § 1563(a)(2)(A) to clarify what the Tax Section perceived to be the congressional intent.
See Committee Recommendations, 27 TAX LAW. 813 (1974). But see, White, supra note 2, at
1377 (not critical of statute finding reason for Commissioner to respond to egregious
abuses).
' See 102 S. Ct. at 828-31; text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
" See 102 S. Ct. at 827-28; text accompanying notes 95-102 infra.
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sister controlled group" connotes a close horizontal relationship is in
itself reasonable." But in light of the dissent's observation that the fifty-
percent common ownership test ensures a close horizontal relationship,"
the majority's contention that the phrase implies that the same indivis-
ible group of five or fewer persons must own at least eighty-percent of
every corporation becomes unpersuasive.9 7 Furthermore, there is no
language in the statute suggesting that the eighty-percent test is to
serve the same purpose as the fifty-percent test. 8 In addition to the prior
assertion, the majority stated that the phrase "five or fewer" is the con-
junctive subject of both the eighty-percent and the fifty-percent re-
quirements.9 The majority relied on the phrase to reason that the
shareholders whose holdings are measured for purposes of the eighty-
percent test must be the identical shareholders whose holdings are
measured in the fifty-percent test.' The dissent, however, suggested an
equally plausible construction. The phrase, "five or fewer," even as the
conjunctive subject, could mean that the total number of shareholders
considered for each test simply cannot exceed five.' 1 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court majority in Vogel relied on the phrases "brother-sister
controlled group" and "five or fewer" as supporting the taxpayer's inter-
pretation of section 1563(a)(2).' °'
In next analyzing the legislative history, the majority began by cor-
rectly observing that the original statute required common ownership."3
According to the majority, the original provisions support the common
ownership requirement in the current eighty-percent test."4 The original
statute, however, measured only one shareholder's holdings, rather than
up to five shareholders' holdings, for purposes of the original statute's
eighty-percent test.9 5 An element of common shareholder holdings is
" See 102 S. Ct. at 827. The statement that the phrase "brother-sister controlled
group" connotes a close horizontal relationship is reasonable in light of the fact that the
phrase appears in the heading of a statute that Congress enacted to measure corporate in-
terrelationships. See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2); Hearings, supra note 59, at 5394.
" 102 S. Ct. at 832.
" See id. at 827. As the dissent in Vogel pointed out, the Vogel majority merely
assumes the conclusion. Id. at 832. No logical reason exists to assume that the heading of a
statute imparts meaning to every test within the statute especially when one test within
the statute already insures that the meaning of the statute's heading is fulfilled. See id.
102 S. Ct. at 832 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (reproduced at note
15 supra).
" See 102 S. Ct. at 827. The Tax Court in Fairfax Auto Parts coined the phrase "con-
junctive subject." 65 T.C. 798, 803 (1976); see note 27 supra. The term conjunctive subject
means that the phrase "five or fewer" functions as the subject of both tests in § 1563(a)(2).
See Fairfax Auto Parts, 65 T.C. at 803; I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2).
10 102 S. Ct. at 827.
"I Id. at 834 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 827.
10 See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 1563 (1964) (current version at I.R.C. § 1563); note 8 supra.
1 102 S. Ct. at 828-29. See text accompanying notes 105-106 infra.
105 26 U.S.C. § 1563 (1964) (current version at I.R.C. § 1563); note 8 supra.
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present in any test that measures the holdings of only one shareholder.
Therefore, the majority's analogy to the prior statute lends only tenuous
support for the common ownership construction.' 6
The Hearings, however, offer more insight into the manifest inten-
tion of Congress.'"' Within the Hearings in the Treasury Department's
"Technical Explanation" for the broadening of the statutory definition of
brother-sister controlled groups, the Department stated that "[t]he same
five or fewer persons [must] own at least 80 percent of the voting stock
... of each corporation and ... these five or fewer individuals" must
satisfy the requisite fifty-percent requirement."' The Vogel majority
correctly concluded that the Department's explanation suggests a com-
mon ownership requirement in the eighty-percent test.' 9 Furthermore,
the Treasury Department's "General Explanation" defined a brother-
sister controlled group as one "in which five or fewer persons own, to a
large extent in identical proportions at least 80 percent of the stock of
each of the corporations.""0 The "General Explanation" also defined the
respective roles of the eighty-percent and fifty-percent tests."' The
Vogel majority interpreted the "General Explanation" as retaining the
eighty-percent requirement as the primary basis for the determination
of whether two or more corporations represent the same financial in-
terests."2 This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the limited
role of the eighty-percent test under the Commissioner's regulation."'
The dissent, however, correctly observed that neither the "General Ex-
planation" nor the "Technical Explanation" specifically addresses
whether the eighty-percent test requires common ownership."' The dis-
sent also noted that a section of the "Technical Explanation" states that
the eighty-percent test "is satisfied if the group of five or fewer persons
as a whole owns at least 80 percent of the voting stock ... of each cor-
10 See 102 S. Ct. at 828-29. But see Weisman, supra note 6, at 479-80. Weisman, and in-
deed other commentators, view the expansion of the statute from "one" to "five or fewer"
persons as logically implying that the same persons make up the ownership group of each
corporation. The Tax Court in Fairfax Auto Parts first formulated the argument. 65 T.C.
798, 804 (1976).
107 See Hearings, supra note 59, at 5165-76, 5385-413.
' Hearings, supra note 59, at 5168 (emphasis in original); see 102 S. Ct. at 829.
10 See 102 S. Ct. at 829. The phraseology in the "Technical Explanation," as pointed
out by the Vogel Court, explicitly requires common ownership in the 80% test. See
Weisman, supra note 6, at 480-81 (noting that the Tax Court in Fairfax Auto Parts, 65 T.C.
798 (1976), failed to discuss this persuasive history).
", Hearings, supra note 59, at 5394. See 102 S. Ct. at 829-30.
" Hearings, supra note 59, at 5394. See 102 S. Ct. at 829-30; note 59 supra (text
quoted).
"1 102 S. Ct. at 829-30. The majority's interpretation of the text of the "General Ex-
planation" as retaining the 80% test is consistent with the language of the explanation. See
Hearings, supra note 59, at 5396. The Tax Court in Fairfax Auto Parts failed to discuss this
section of the "General Explanation." 65 T.C. 798 (1976).
"' See text accompanying notes 119-129 infra.
114 See 102 S. Ct. at 834; Hearings, supra note 59, at 5165-76, 5385-413.
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poration regardless of the size of individual holdings of each person."'' 5
The dissent construed the phrase as supporting the Commissioner's in-
terpretation."' The Vogel Court stated that great weight must be given
the Treasury Department's representations before Congress."' The
Treasury Department's proposals, while certainly not definitive, tend to
support the taxpayer's interpretation of the statute."8
While the legislative history of section 1563(a)(2) is not as unam-
biguous as the Supreme Court majority in Vogel intimated, the congres-
sional purpose gleaned from the history of the multiple corporation pro-
visions further supports the taxpayer's interpretation of the statute.
The provisions of section 1563, when satisfied, ensure that the corpora-
tions are controlled and operated as a single economic entity.' Congress
formulated the objective tests of section 1563(a)(2) to eliminate the
necessity of resorting to subjective evaluation of the parties' possible
tax motivations for employing multiple corporations.20 The fifty-percent
test ensures that the members of a controlled group operate as a single
economic entity.12' The eighty-percent test ensures that the shareholders
in control own substantial common financial interests.' The regulation's
interpretation of the statute renders the fifty-percent financial interest
test meaningless." Congress clearly intended to establish a two-pronged
"' 102 S. Ct. at 834; see Hearings, supra note 59, at 5969.
,11 102 S. Ct. at 834. The majority in Vogel, however, stated that the language
"regardless of the size of the individual holdings of each person" seems to "assume" that
each individual has interests in each corporation. Id. at 830 n.11. As the dissent in Vogel
pointed out in a note, the Commissioner and the taxpayers previously have cited the same
legislative material as supporting opposite conclusions. Id. at 834 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). See Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting
other courts have interpreted the same legislative language as supporting contrary posi-
tions). Compare Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 803-04
(1976) (citing Hearings, supra note 59, at 5394 as supporting common ownership) with 65
T.C. at 809-10 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citing same section of Hearings, supra note 59, at
5394 as supporting no common ownership requirement).
, 102 S. Ct. at 830-31; accord Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969).
, See, e.g., Weisman, supra note 6, at 481; White, supra note 2, at 1367. But see
Bonovitz, supra note 4, at 516; 102 S. Ct. at 834 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"I E.g., Weisman, supra note 6, at 484; White, supra note 2, at 1353. See Hearings,
supra note 59, at 5394.
Il See H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-223, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1425-32; Weisman, supra note 6, at 484.
121 See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(B); Hearings,'supra note 59, at 5394-96; Weisman, supra note
6, at 484. See also Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 805
(1976).
"' See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(A); Hearings, supra note 59, at 5394; Thomas, supra note 4, at
79; Weisman, supra note 2; at 484.
" See text accompanying notes 126-129 infra; Bonovitz, supra note 4, at 516-19;
Thomas, supra note 4, at 83. See also T. L. Hunt, Inc. of Tex. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532,
536-37 (8th Cir. 1977) (Webster, J., dissenting) (regulation nullifies 80% test); Fairfax Auto
Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 806 (1976) (regulation ignores basic func-
tion of 80% test).
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test."'24 Not only did the regulation's interpretation conflict with congres-
sional intent, the interpretation also resulted in illogical results in light
of the motivations for promulgating multiple corporation provisions."
To require that an additional thirty percent be owned by someone else
adds nothing to the controlled group test of control because more than
fifty-percent identical ownership is already in the hands of five or fewer
persons.2 ' Without a requirement of ownership in each corporation of
124 Hearings, supra note 59, at 5394; accord I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2).
1 See note 126 infra.
I" T. L. Hunt, Inc. of Tex. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532, 537 (8th Cir. 1977) (Webster,
J., dissenting); Thomas, supra note 4, at 83. Under the regulation's interpretation the 80%
test adds nothing. Assume the following ownership percentages in X and Y corporation:
Corporation Identical
X Y Ownership
Individuals A ... 40% 45% 40/o
B . . . 20/o 15%/ 15%/
C . . . 0% 40% 0%
D. .. 20% 0% 0%
E . . . 20% 0% 0%
100% 100% 55%
The example satisfies the 50% identical ownership test under the taxpayer's or the Com-
missioner's interpretation. See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293,
1973-2 C.B. 248. Under the taxpayer's interpretation of the statute, corporations X and Y do
not satisfy the 800/o test. See 102 S. Ct. at 826; I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(A). A and B's ownership in-
terests total only 60/o. D and E's ownership interests cannot be considered because D and
E own no interest in Y corporation. See 102 S. Ct. at 826; I.R.C. § 1563(a(2)(A). Likewise, C's
ownership interest cannot be counted because C owns no interest in X corporation. See 102
S. Ct. at 826; I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(A). Under the regulation's interpretation, however, corpora-
tions X and Y are component members of a brother-sister controlled group of corporations.
See 102 S. Ct. at 826; Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 248. The 80/o test
under the regulation's interpretations only ensures that five or fewer persons hold 8 0/o
ownership. See 102 S. Ct. at 826; Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 248. The
500/0 test ensures that A and B have control of X and Y corporations. See I.R.C. §
1563(a)(2)(B). To satisfy the regulation's interpretation of the 800/o test, any three
shareholders must hold at least 25% of the remaining 45% that A and B do not own in this
example. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 248. To require that a small
group own stock comprising the incremental percentage difference between the already
satisfied 500/o test and the yet unsatisfied 80% tests adds little to the overall control test
because A and B already control the corporation. See Bonovitz, supra note 4, at 518. The
80% test adopted by the Vogel Court, however, ensures that the component members are
the same entity from a shareholder point of view. See 102 S. Ct. at 832; Bonovitz, supra note
4, at 518. For example, if C owned interest in X corporation and D and E owned interest in
Y corporation, X and Y corporation fulfill the Vogel Court's interpretation of the brother-
sister controlled group test. See 102 S. Ct. at 832; I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2). The 800/0 test ensures
that C, D, and E, in addition to A and B, have common financial interest in the component
members. Thus, C, D, and E at least are aware of the other corporations activities. In light
of the fact that C, D, and E's ownership interests satisfy the 80% test for the corporation, it
is reasonable that C, D, and E have some ownership in the corporation. To consider C, D,
and E's stock holdings for purposes of satisfying the 80% test in another corporation that C,
D, and E might not even know existed is inequitable. The Commissioner's regulation,
however, allows the inequity. See Kringel, supra note 92, at 358; Thomas, supra note 4, at
65-66, 82-84.
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the controlled group for purposes of the eighty-percent test, the regula-
tion reaches nonsensical results. 17 The regulation considers persons part
of a group that controls a corporation, even where that person has no in-
terest, control or influence in the corporation. 28 Therefore, the
taxpayer's interpretation of the statute rather than the Commissioner's
regulation is correct." The eighty-percent test is meaningful only when
the statute considers persons who have control of the corporation for
purposes of the eighty-percent financial interest requirement."'
The regulation in Vogel broadened the statute's coverage."' The
statute in Vogel, however, is definitional and should be construed
strictly. 32 The Supreme Court has not hesitated to invalidate regulations
construed as an impermissible broadening of a statute's coverage. 2 Fur-
thermore, while the legislative history is less than definitive, con-
siderable inconsistency exists between the regulation and the legislative
history of the statute."' Most notably, the Treasury Department did not
propose to Congress any example exhibiting the ownership
characteristics that the regulation now attempts to encompass. 13 5 Finally,
the regulation's application renders results in many instances that are
contrary to the manifest congressional intent.3 ' The Supreme Court in
Vogel, therefore, had ample reason to invalidate the regulation.1
3
1
The impact of the decision in Vogel is far reaching. The coverage of
the brother-sister controlled group statute potentially affects countless
small corporations." 8 The long awaited decision definitively solved a tax-
payer's dilemma. After Vogel, only shareholders with holdings in every
corporation within the potential controlled group can be considered for
purposes of the eighty-percent test."3 9 Considering the wide impact of
the statute and the conflicting decisions prior to Vogel, taxpayers needed
a definitive resolution. The Vogel Court's interpretation of the statute is
" See note 126 supra.
"8 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 248; note 126 supra.
'" See note 126 supra.
I1 d.
131 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 248; I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2); text ac-
companying notes 119-129 supra.
" Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 627 (1975); Commissioner v. Acker, 361
U.S. 87, 91 (1959). But see Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 n.8 (1978) (held strict
construction not applicable to personal holding company tax penalty).
11 See note 132 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 103-118 supra.
's5 See Hearings, supra note 59, at 5165-76, 5385-413.
128 See note 126 supra.
11, See text accompanying notes 119-129 supra.
Il The far reaching impact of the Vogel decision is apparent in light of the fact that at
the time the Supreme Court in Vogel granted certiorari, there were 223 cases pending on
appeal on the same issue. Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Claims, at 7, United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct. 821 (1982).
1' See note 126 supra.
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a reasonable implementation of the congressional mandate. " ' The dis-
sent agrees that the majority's interpretation is reasonable."' While the
regulation is neither unreasonable nor clearly inconsistent with the
statute, the Supreme Court in Vogel exercised sound discretion in over-
ruling the regulation to implement the manifest intent of Congress.
WILLIAM TURNER JOHNSON
14' See text accompanying notes 119-129 supra.
.4 102 S. Ct. at 832.
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